Questions arise regarding the double standards in U.S. foreign policy, where North Korea is permitted to develop its nuclear program while Washington seeks to prevent Iran from doing so. In an article on The Hill, author Harlan Ullman pointed out the contradictions in the logic of U.S. policy towards both nuclear programs.
Ullman addressed the American war on Iran, which was launched on the premise that Tehran was on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons. He considered this war to be a clear paradox, as it was claimed that previous military operations had destroyed Iran's nuclear capabilities, creating a gap between the declared threats and the alleged outcomes.
Details of the Event
In addition to the nuclear program, the war on Iran also aimed to change the ruling regime and destroy Iranian military capabilities. However, the author believes that the outcomes remain unresolved, especially with ongoing tensions in the Strait of Hormuz.
When comparing Iran and North Korea, Ullman recalls the crisis of 2017, when Pyongyang conducted advanced nuclear and missile tests, demonstrating its ability to strike distant targets. Tensions escalated dangerously, with then-President Donald Trump threatening “fire and fury,” while North Korea responded with similarly aggressive rhetoric, raising fears of a nuclear war.
Background & Context
At that time, the world was on the brink of disaster, with officials and experts estimating alarming probabilities of war, including the potential for nuclear escalation. However, diplomatic channels ultimately prevailed, as Trump and Kim exchanged messages and held several summits, leading to a de-escalation of tensions without resorting to war.
Trump described his relationship with Kim in friendly terms, a sharp departure from his previous rhetoric. From this perspective, Ullman sees this trajectory as revealing a contradiction in current policy, where North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and the capability to strike the U.S., while Iran “has neither a bomb nor the ability to attack the United States.”
Impact & Consequences
Despite this, Washington chose diplomacy with Pyongyang and war with Tehran. This leads Ullman to pose his central question: “Why is Iran considered more dangerous than North Korea?” He places the issue in its historical context, noting that America fought a devastating war against North Korea in the 1950s, a war that has not officially ended to this day.
In contrast, despite decades of tension with Iran, the scale of direct conflict has been much less. This, in the author's view, deepens the paradox in the handling of both cases. Ullman does not provide a definitive answer but insists that the question deserves serious discussion.
Regional Significance
These contradictions raise questions about how U.S. policy affects stability in the Middle East. Ongoing tensions between Iran and the United States could lead to escalations in regional crises, impacting regional security. Additionally, the lessons learned from dealing with North Korea may reshape Arab countries' strategies in addressing nuclear threats.
In conclusion, Ullman urges decision-makers to interpret what appears to be a double standard in U.S. policy, suggesting that decisions may be driven by changing political calculations rather than objective assessments of threats.