Warnings are escalating in Israel over the widening gap between the official narrative of "major achievements" and "achieved victory" and a more complex military reality that reveals the continued ability of adversaries to resist and reorganize. This gap is not merely a difference in assessments; it reflects failures in the intelligence and political systems that Israel relies on for war decisions.
Surprises are recurring in Israeli wars, where a repeated pattern of optimistic assessments regarding deterrence emerges, along with exaggerations in measuring the damage inflicted on the adversary. These assessments assume that severe strikes will quickly lead to the collapse of hostile will or the overthrow of regimes, but the facts indicate otherwise.
Details of the Event
In an article by prominent writer Nahum Barnea in Yedioth Ahronoth, it is noted that the facts do not support the idea of a "great victory," as the downing of aircraft and the adversary's continued ability to repair its systems and respond with missiles and drones all contradict political celebrations. The problem lies not only in military performance but also in the nature of political leadership that replaces objective evaluation with a mobilization discourse directed at the public.
Barnea believes that war is no longer a field for rational risk management but has turned into a platform for producing illusions and suggestions of imminent resolution. This intelligence failure reflects an inability to predict the collapse or resilience of regimes, as Israel misjudged the fate of the Syrian regime and its ability to politically overcome the shock of October 7.
Context and Background
National security expert Shira Barabibai Shaham discusses that the failure is not an isolated incident but a recurring pattern of exaggeration in assessing Israeli deterrence. Surprises in Hezbollah's behavior and the resilience of the Iranian regime are understood as a direct result of a systematic flaw in evaluation. Intelligence agencies not only misjudge the adversary's capabilities but also misunderstand its intentions and the duration of its recovery.
The most dangerous paradox is that every round of fighting is marketed internally as a deterrent achievement, yet the next round reveals that the deterrence was weaker than claimed, and the enemy regained a significant portion of its capability faster than estimated. This was the case with Hamas before October 7 and is repeating with Hezbollah after the 2024 war, as well as in the Iran conflict.
Consequences and Impact
The repercussions of these failures extend beyond security assessments, as war decisions are based on optimistic assumptions, placing Israeli leadership in a double bind: an inability to decisively act and a failure to acknowledge the limits of power. This leads to an escalation of rhetoric or the export of false victory narratives to alleviate internal pressure.
Military analyst Amos Harel adds a third dimension, noting that achieving tactical success through air power and focused strikes does not necessarily translate into strategic results. Attacks against Iran may have weakened its leadership structure, but they did not push the regime toward flexibility or surrender; rather, they may have made it more rigid.
Impact on the Arab Region
Israel appears to be facing a dilemma deeper than the outcomes of a specific battle, a dilemma of understanding the limits of power and intelligence. Intelligence failures become a factor generating strategic confusion, widening the gap between public expectations and what the political institution can actually achieve.
Ultimately, the question arising in Israel is not only: why has complete victory not been achieved? But also: why does the political and security establishment insist on defining victory in a way not supported by the field? These questions reflect a complex reality that requires a comprehensive reassessment of the policies and strategies in place.