Rafael Grossi, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), warned on April 21 that "some nuclear materials in Syria have an unknown fate," noting that agency inspectors found nuclear materials linked to an undeclared program overseen by the former Syrian regime.
These statements follow nearly ten months of renewed cooperation between the agency and Damascus, during which verification operations were conducted to track materials believed to have been concealed by the previous regime.
Details of the Incident
According to testimonies from defectors of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, notably Ali Reza Asghari, Tehran, in collaboration with North Korea, established a nuclear site in the Al-Kubar area of Deir ez-Zor. This site was bombed by Israel in coordination with Washington in 2007, a fact that Israel acknowledged only after more than ten years.
Iran aimed to create this site as a complement to a reactor near Arak, which is intended for heavy water production. The information provided by Asghari contributed to identifying and targeting the site by Israeli forces.
In 2009, the German newspaper Der Spiegel reported details from Israeli intelligence officials regarding the intelligence efforts that led to obtaining information about the site, where "Mossad" agents managed to infiltrate the computer of a Syrian security figure in London and copy information confirming the production of fissile materials.
Background & Context
In September 2025, an IAEA report indicated the discovery of particles of natural uranium, suggesting chemical processing operations at the site that was bombed.
Der Spiegel also revealed in January 2015 intelligence documents confirming the existence of a secret underground complex in the Qusayr area, which could be used for manufacturing nuclear weapons. The documents indicated that the Assad regime had transferred 8,000 fuel rods to this site under the supervision of Iranian and North Korean experts.
In 2011, the Institute for Science and International Security discussed information about the construction of a nuclear site east of Damascus, believed to be linked to the Al-Kubar reactor. This site was designated for uranium conversion and is likely to have been emptied of its contents following the bombing of the Al-Kubar reactor.
Impact & Consequences
The Syrian Atomic Energy Commission emphasized the importance of developing cooperation with the IAEA after the new government took over the country's administration. In June 2025, the new government granted permission to agency inspectors to conduct verification operations in Syria.
In early 2026, the Director General of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission, Mudar Al-Akkala, met with Grossi to discuss outstanding issues, including the previous regime's nuclear activities.
Regional Significance
These developments are concerning in the context of regional security, as security sources indicate that the IAEA has the capability to locate nuclear materials via satellite. There are fears that former regime officers may have transferred some of these materials out of Syria following Assad's fall.
Concerns are growing about a potential link between the curtailment of some of these officers' activities in the countries they fled to, such as Iraq, and the agency's efforts to determine the fate of the missing nuclear materials.
In conclusion, the issue of nuclear materials in Syria remains one of the major challenges facing regional and international security, necessitating close monitoring by the international community.