Security challenges are increasing in Iraq amid rising regional conflict, as the Baghdad government grapples with armed factions embedded within state institutions and beyond. These factions, once considered a shield for the state, have now become a burden, raising questions about the erosion of Iranian influence in the country.
In an episode of the program "Understanding Attempts," this complex issue was addressed with its historical and contemporary dimensions, where experts reviewed the emergence of Iraqi armed factions and their relationship with Tehran, Baghdad, and Washington. According to Iranian affairs journalist Abdul Qadir Fayez, the roots of the current scene date back to 2003, when the Americans dissolved the Iraqi army, allowing a Shiite political elite nurtured by Iran to rise.
Details of the Event
The Iranian influence facilitated the rise of that elite to power, but Tehran worked to undermine the democratic model introduced by the Americans, viewing the success of Shiites in Iraq as a direct threat to its national security. Fayez pointed out that Iranian regional influence was not built on expansionist ambitions but rather emerged from a defensive strategy documented by Tehran in 1991 after its war with Iraq.
The U.S. refusal to involve Iran in the Madrid Peace Conference in 1993 led Tehran to adopt the principle of transferring the battle beyond its borders, resulting in the establishment of a comprehensive regional influence network operating in the realm of revolution rather than state. Dr. Haider Saeed, head of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies Unit at the Arab Center for Research, indicated that the foundational moment for Iraqi armed factions did not come with the emergence of the Islamic State in 2014, but preceded it by several years.
Background & Context
In 2011, with the onset of the Arab Spring and the Syrian revolution, the ruling Shiite elite felt threatened, prompting former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to rehabilitate the factions he had fought in the "Charge of the Knights" in 2008, turning them into a complementary force to the official security institution. This shift reflects a deep division within the Shiite elite regarding how to deal with armed factions.
Dr. Mohannad Saloum, a professor of security studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, pointed to the ambiguous legal status of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which are funded by billions of dinars monthly but refuse to integrate into the Iraqi army, making them an entity resembling the Iranian Revolutionary Guard without a supreme leader.
Impact & Consequences
This comfortable situation is now in jeopardy, especially after the U.S. embassy in Baghdad announced that members of the factions hold official government identities, and Washington began targeting PMF positions. Saloum considered that the ability of these factions to harm U.S. interests remains limited, but they inflict severe damage on Iraq itself and its relations with Gulf states.
Experts agree that the scene is heading towards the beginning of the end of Iranian regional influence in its current form, as war-weary Iran will not be able to sustain this extensive network at the same level, while internal Iraqi pressures are rising towards consolidating arms in the hands of the state.
Regional Significance
Local and regional actors seeking to reduce Iranian influence are increasing, from the Kurdish actor who sees the factions as an existential threat to Gulf states that differentiate between Iraq as a state and the Iranian arm within it. Additionally, a broad segment of the Iraqi Shiite elite recognizes that reliance on armed factions could jeopardize the entire political project.
In conclusion, Iraq appears to be at a crossroads, facing increasing internal and external challenges, necessitating a comprehensive reassessment of the relationships between armed factions and the state, as well as the role of Iranian influence in the region.